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Grasslands are an important ecological and economic resource in the United 
States. As part of a natural system, these landscapes can provide income for ranching 
operations and employment in rural communities; habitat for grassland plants, animals, 
and migratory species; and offer other services not always readily observed such as 
improved soil health, clean water, and carbon sequestration. Despite the overarching 
benefits, the conversion of grasslands to other uses remains widespread throughout much 
of the remaining Great Plains ecosystem. 
Shifting from livestock ranching to another land use often reflects a tipping point. 
This occurs when the alternative land use is perceived to outweigh the risks and losses 
stemming from grassland conversion. Large areas of grasslands are privately owned in 
the US, but many of the benefits that are provided are nontraditional public goods. The 
conversion of naturally functioning landscapes can be ecologically disruptive and come 
at a detriment to both private and public interests. Alternative marketing opportunities 
and revitalized conservation efforts may be necessary to create linkages between private 
land management and the supply of services from healthy grassland ecosystems.  
Using Nebraska’s statewide wildlife management plan as a guide, we developed a 
hypothetical grassland ecosystem services market and tested the programmatic 
 
 
preferences of ranchers who would sell the services produced from their lands. In testing 
attributes related to management, contract length, and payment level, we found that 
ranchers indicated strong preferences for the types of management actions that were 
incentivized and not the accompanying contract length or payment. This research 
contributes to conservation literature in the areas of conjoint choice experiments and 
incomplete confounded factorial experimental design. It may also have utility in the form 
of market research for the future piloting of ecosystem services programs.  
















“While conservation actions in the past have had notable successes, they have not 
been sufficient to stem the overall tide of species decline. There is a need for a 
comprehensive, systematic, and proactive approach to conserving the full array of 
Nebraska’s biological diversity.” 


















Growing up in northwest Iowa, I relished in the stories of what made grasslands 
great. To learn that birds, mammals, and hordes of insects were just a part of everyday 
life was hard to fathom. By then, of course, the spectacular arrays of wetlands, the 
mosaics of prairie habitats, and the diversity of avifauna had become just that...stories. To 
think that over one million square miles with some of the richest species diversity could 
one day disappear is troubling. Because, at least for now, it forces us to accept that 
immense swaths of the Great Plains have already vanished. For anyone who considers 
grassland preservation and expansion a cause worth supporting, thank you. 
 To the innumerable collaborators of this project, I owe you a debt of gratitude for 
your time and energy. Without you, this work would not have been possible: Nebraska 
Cattlemen's Association; USDA, North Central Research, Sustainable Agriculture 
Research and Education; Nebraska Extension; Nebraska Game and Parks Commission; 
Nebraska Grazing Lands Coalition; Sandhills Task Force; The Nature Conservancy 
Nebraska; Ficke Cattle Company; Dr. Jerry Volesky; Dr. Craig Allen; and the hundreds 
of ranchers who participated in the study—during calving season no less. 
A special thanks to Dr. Kent Eskridge, a key informant on the design and analysis 
of our experiment. And to Dr. Mark Burbach, my advisor and ad hoc therapist, thanks for 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Background 
 Grasslands are considered one of the most widespread, most imperiled, and least 
protected vegetation types on earth (Hoekstra, et al., 2005; Lipsey et al., 2015). Because 
of their productivity—often resulting from centuries of natural and pastoral 
interactions—these areas have long been a prominent target for conversion to agriculture 
(Samson & Knopf, 1994; Hoekstra et al., 2005). As climatic conditions shift and the 
demands for food, fuel, and fiber increase with the global population, it should be 
expected that grasslands continue to be among the world’s most altered and least 
protected ecosystems (Wright & Wimberly, 2013).  
According to Rashford et al. (2011), converting native grasslands to other uses 
(i.e., cultivated cropland) is “historically extensive and continues worldwide today” (p. 
277). In the US, the development of the Great Plains grasslands was borne out of 
economics and farm policy sown in the 1870s (Samson & Knopf, 1994). In the century 
that followed, Claassen et al. (2012) suggest that an estimated 260 million acres of the 
region’s 550 million acres of native grasslands were upturned. Today, estimates suggest 
North American grasslands only cover 40% of the historical range (Wilsey et al., 2019). 
In the last twenty years, dramatic price swings in crop commodities have further 
increased grassland losses in the US. A precise accounting remains elusive—due to 
decentralized approaches in cataloging cropland (Joshi et al., 2019). However, an 
analysis by Claassen, et al. (2012) suggests the entire Northern Great Plains (NGP)—
about 18% of all domestic grassland acres—accounted for 57% of the gross domestic 




commodity price increases, other studies in this region suggest that an average of 1-5% of 
NGP grasslands are converted every year (Claassen et al., 2012; Wright & Wimberly, 
2013; Gage et al., 2016). 
While the record-high commodity prices have subsided, Lark et al. (2020) suggest 
the threat to grasslands persists. Their recent analysis, examining conversion trends 
during and after the 2007-2012 commodity price booms, indicates the total rate of 
converted acres did fall following the 2011-2012 peak. However, the gross conversion 
rate stabilized near 1 million acres per year for several years thereafter. Further, the 
researchers suggest, due to a lack of other suitable lands for conversion, longstanding 
habitat or land that was categorized as agriculturally marginal was brought into 
production. Overall, the highest rates of loss of “natural landcover” occurred in the 
western corn belt and western Great Plains—the leading edge of westward land-use 
conversion (Olimb & Robinson, 2019).  
Western grasslands in the US are arguably the last remaining vestige of the Great 
Plains, and cattle ranching has been its principal use for decades (Fleischner, 1994). 
However, this dynamic has changed rapidly since the 2000s. Economic conditions in 
agriculture, trends in urbanization, and energy development—as well as demographic and 
normative trends in ranching communities—are pushing these remaining grasslands and 
associated natural communities to a breaking point (Goldstein et al., 2011). To what 
extent policy should be used as an intervention tool appears to be a moving target for 
policymakers, conservation managers, and agricultural producers.  
Grasslands embody America’s ancestral and modern agricultural identity. These 




permeate through generations (Gutwein & Goldstein, 2013; Havstad et al., 2007; Gentner 
& Tanaka, 2002). With the pressures from cropland conversion, urbanization, energy 
development, and woody encroachment on the rise, these grasslands future as the “Great 
Plains” is uncertain. If the array of benefits grasslands offer is to be maintained, a shift in 
conservation strategies and scale is urgently needed to address the growing needs of 
ranchers, rural economies, and wildlife populations (Krausman et al., 2009). 
Complexities in Land-use Conversion 
The issues surrounding grassland conversion are complex and interconnected, but 
not unfamiliar. Profitability, suburban population expansion, energy development, and an 
aging workforce are commonly cited as drivers of land-use conversion (Goldstein, 2011). 
Technological innovations in equipment, seed genetics, agrichemicals, and irrigation 
systems are also principal factors as intensive agriculture expands into marginally 
productive regions (Claassen et al., 2012). Shifts in climate and weather are also aiding 
row-crop expansion as areas previously deemed unsuitable are targeted for production 
(Reitsma et al., 2015). Several analyses (Rashford et al., 2011; Wang et al., 2017; Lark et 
al., 2019) have detected linkages to federal policy—predominantly crop insurance—as a 
multiplier effect, thus increasing motivations to convert grasslands. 
The historic row crop price increases in the early 2000s offer context. At that 
time, federal crop subsidies for corn, wheat, and soybeans totaled $11.1 billion while 
those for livestock grazing were $267 million (Environmental Working Group, 2005). 
The subsidies provided a new risk aversion tactic that had otherwise been unavailable to 
many farmers (US GAO, 2007; Miao et al., 2016). Claassen et al. (2012) explain that the 




led to an additional 2.9% increase in total cropland acreage expansion during this period. 
Bauman et al. (2014) also found that many of the subsidy programs during this timeframe 
had inverse effects on enrollment in land conservation programs. These conditions helped 
exacerbate typical grassland conversion rates according to Miao et al. (2016). The 
researchers suggest that because subsidies effectively covered losses for cropping 
previously unsuitable areas, some of the overall risks and cost of land conversion were 
mitigated as part of a broader commodity safety net. 
State and federal subsidization of biofuel industries are also driving motivations 
to convert grasslands (Nash, 2007; Fargione et al., 2009; Wright & Wimberly, 2013). 
During the initial buildout of the industry in the early 2000s, 4.2 million acres of 
grasslands within 100-miles of these refineries helped fuel the demand for corn-based 
ethanol (Wright et al. (2017). As production targets increased, semi-arid grasslands that 
were highly unsuited for crop production were also converted to cropland and sustained 
through increases in irrigation (Wright & Wimberly, 2013). The viability for crop-based 
biofuels as a greener alternative to oil is diminishing as the high costs of land conversion, 
water use, and reliance on fossil fuels are becoming realized (Ott et al., 2020). However, 
Lark et al. (2015) suggest that the industry and policies surrounding have already 
prompted “the greatest transformation to cropland since the ‘fencerow-to-fencerow’ era 
of the 1970s” (p. 1).  
The promise of higher returns from alternative land use is an important 
consideration for someone in livestock ranching. But in totality, what are the sunken 
costs of converting grasslands to other uses? Increases in soil erosion and decreases in 




(Pimentel et al., 1995; Swengel & Swengel, 2015; Lipsey et al., 2015). There are also 
concerns about the release of ancient carbon stores (Eve et al., 2002; Gascoigne et al., 
2011), impairment of water resources due to depletion and the introduction of 
agrichemicals (Faber, et al., 2012), as well as the extirpation of soil life (Lipson & Kelly, 
2014). If widespread grassland conversion continues across the remaining 770 million 
acres of grasslands in the US (USDA, 2021c), a disruption in the delivery of some 
ecosystem services at regional and national scales should be expected (Lark et al., 2020; 
Gage et al., 2016).  
Statement of the Problem 
Why private landowners choose to engage in operational diversification or 
outright land-use conversion is settled among researchers: it is complex. There are 
economic motivators, but there are also technological advancements, personal norms, and 
lifestyle amenities that may simultaneously be at play when operational decisions are 
formulated (Kennedy et al., 2016; Gutwein & Goldstein, 2013; Claassen et al., 2012). 
Regardless of the rationale, the interminable loss of environmental benefits is normally 
expected because of the financial costs associated with landscape conversion and future 
land restoration (Wachenheim & Lesch, 2014). Additionally, services such as carbon 
sequestration (Eve et al., 2002), the building of organic matter, and recovery of the soil 
biota can take decades to achieve (Gelfand et al., 2011), often with varying degrees of 
success (Wang et al., 2017).  
There is less consensus surrounding the most effective policy mechanism that can 
address the steady decline of grasslands. With an annual budget of $5.7 billion (USDA 




resource for private lands conservation. However, research shows these programs are 
more supportive of crop production and less conducive to incentivized conservation or 
assurances of environmental quality (Smith et al., 2011; Lichtenberg, 2014; Claassen et 
al, 2016). For example, despite record-high participation in 2007, the core suite of 
conservation offerings were dramatically reduced in the ensuing Farm Bills. The question 
of how to achieve increasing needs for long-term conservation alongside the shrinking 
availability of programs adapted for the short-term is problematic.  
The Conservation Reserve Program (CRP), one of the most widely recognized 
voluntary conservation programs in the US, provides an interesting case study. Since 
2007, legislative action has lowered acreage targets in each of the three subsequent Farm 
Bills. This has resulted in landowner enrollment declines of more than 14 million acres 
over the same period (USDA, 2021a). One programmatic counterpart, the Conservation 
Stewardship Program, experienced an over two-thirds reduction in acres under contract 
dropping from 20 million to 6.42 million since 2009 (USDA, 2021b). It has been 
suggested that precipitous drops in acreage enrollment can exacerbate environmental 
degradation, triggering net losses to habitat and associated wildlife (Lark et al., 2020). 
This occurs as previously undisturbed, environmentally sensitive, or marginally 
productive areas are brought into crop production because of a lack of suitable land-use 
alternatives (Hendricks & Er, 2018).  
Morefield et al., (2016) note changes in enrollment targets often coincide with the 
expansion of cropland acres across the US. This reflects the origins of these programs as 
supply management tools (Reichelderfer & Boggess, 1988), but even recent policy 




2017). As incentives and enrollment opportunities have decreased, so too has landowner 
interest in programs such as CRP (Osteen et al., 2012). According to Hendricks & Er 
(2018), the effectiveness of using commodity price control mechanisms for land 
conservation is questionable given enrollment caps are set years before the market 
conditions are known. Given these trends, it may not be prudent to rely solely on federal 
programs to achieve long-term, landscape-scale conservation of grasslands. 
The compounding effects of farm policy, commodity prices, and a lack of suitable 
land-use alternatives raise important questions about the current state and future design of 
grassland conservation programs. How do we not only enhance the conservation of 
grasslands but also safeguard the benefits that are provided at regional and national 
scales? One alternative conservation framework that has emerged in the literature, 
payment for ecosystem services (PES), notably shifts resources away from a narrow set 
of management practices and redirects it toward landscape-level management of 
ecosystem services (Engel et al., 2008).  
Voluntary conservation programs are normally rooted in what Sorice and Donlan 
(2015) suggest is a well-intentioned reaction to focus exclusively on the needs of 
imperiled species. While this approach has been popular with incentivized programs of 
the past (Dayer et al., 2018), it notably does not align with the needs, values, or abilities 
of those tasked with the species’ recovery or protection effort (Donlan, 2015). The most 
obvious implication becomes one of persistence: will the desired management activity 
continue beyond the life of the incentive? An accounting of expiring CRP contacts from 
2010-2013 in 12 Great Plains states would suggest not. Morefield et al. (2016) found a 




were the largest type of lands converted (360,000 ha). While the authors note reduced 
enrollment targets and commodity prices helped propel this trend, the lack of returns for 
taxpayer investment is problematic in the absence of behavioral persistence (Dayer et al., 
2018). 
Sorice and Donlan (2015) further suggest that because voluntary conservation 
program participation is “grounded by place, and occurs in different social, political, 
cultural, and economic contexts” (p. 791), programs of the future should take proactive 
measures to better account for participants’ rights, livelihoods, and values. While the 
dynamics of conservation in agricultural landscapes are no doubt complex, successful 
conservation efforts must produce cost-effective, long-term, and landscape-level impacts. 
It is from this lens that we explore the foundation of a human-centered approach to 
grassland ecosystem services conservation in the Great Plains.  
Ecosystem services, broadly operationalized by Daily (1997) “are the conditions 
and processes through which natural ecosystems, and the species that make them up, 
sustain and fulfill human life” (p. 3). While this is no longer an innovation in 
communicating the benefits of the naturally occurring systems, there are shortcomings in 
incentivizing the conservation of the many services healthy grasslands provide. PES 
programs aid this process by incorporating free-market enterprise with the supply of 
services resulting from sustainable grassland management (Hansen et al., 2018).  
Research Question 
 The research question posited in this quantitative analysis was: which 
combination of contract attributes are most likely to lead to the participation of ranchers 




for our study pertained to the identification of lower-order interactions among 
conservation management practices, payment levels, and contract lengths. 
Significance of this Study 
Federal subsidies and direct payments for conservation-orientated activities to 
private landowners are not new, coming to the mainstream during the economic and 
ecological turmoil of the 1930s. While there have been notable successes in the areas of 
species and habitat protection, conservation efforts have largely been unsuccessful at 
stopping overall species decline (Schneider et al., 2011). At a period when livestock 
ranchers attempt to navigate rising input costs, thin profit margins, turbulent international 
trade policy, and increasingly high property taxes, converting grasslands to other uses 
may be the only plausible option for operations to remain profitable.  
The decision to convert grasslands to row cropping systems is not a turnkey 
financial strategy, it emphasizes relative prices and expected returns over many years 
(Rashford et al. 2011; Miao et al., 2013). However, in the past 20 years, grassland 
conversion has outpaced conservation and rivaled mass conversion events preceding the 
Dust Bowl and those of the fencerow-to-fencerow era in the 1970s (Lark et al., 2015). 
This study looks to PES programs as a framework to stabilize rancher revenues, enhance 
conservation outcomes, maintain ecosystem services, and keep the remaining Great 






Definition of Terms 
When introducing new programmatic or conceptual models, terminology and 
frameworks are utilized to further the reader’s understanding of the scientific research or 
industry practice. To assist in the clarity of this publication, commonly cited terms and 
definitions from PES researchers are included here:  
Biodiversity - The phenomenon of how organisms and their genetic differences interact 
among ecological communities, landscapes, and ecosystems West (1993). Biodiversity 
plays multiple roles in the delivery of ecosystem services (Mace, Norris, & Fitter, 2012).  
 
Ecosystem services - A framework for analyzing relationships between humans and 
nature. Specifically, according to Daily (1997), “…the conditions and processes through 
which natural ecosystems, and the species that make them up, sustain and fulfill human 
life.” 
 
Grasslands - Land cover/use terminology applied interchangeably in reference to native 
grasslands, tame seeded grass, rangelands, and associated habits (e.g., wetlands).  
 
Heterogeneity - The complexity and/or variability of a system property in space and 
or/time (Li & Reynolds, 1995). 
 
Human-centered conservation design - An innovative solution to conservation issues that 
incorporates empathy for participants, co-designing program approaches, and transfer 
technology through rapid prototyping of program concepts (Sorice & Donlan, 2015).  
 
Motivation crowding - Theory that suggests increases in prosocial behavior through 
external incentives will fluctuate based on a ‘crowding-in’ or ‘crowding-out’ of intrinsic 
motivations (Cranford & Mourato, 2014).  
 
Nebraska Natural Legacy Project - Nebraska’s state wildlife management plan. This 
planning document is required by the federal government in all states and revised at least 
every ten years.  
 
Payment for ecosystem services (PES) - A broad term used to describe emerging 
environmental markets (Gutwein & Goldstein, 2013). PES programs are often viewed as 
environmental subsidies, wherein a landowner receives a compensatory payment for 
engaging in conservation activities on private lands (Hansen, et al., 2018).  
 
Persistence - The assumption that landowners who participate in incentive programs will 
continue the practice once the payments expire (Dayer, Lutter, Sesser, Hickey, & Gardali, 




CHAPTER 2: REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
Introduction 
Grasslands are an important ecological and economic resource in Nebraska. These 
areas provide income for ranching operations and rural communities, habitat for prairie 
plants, animals, and migratory species, and offer non-typical tax revenue for local 
governments from activities like tourism and recreation (Vaisley & Strankman, 1999). As 
rich fields of species diversity, vast stores of ancient carbon, and strongholds of superior 
habitat, the existence of this ecosystem is seen as essential in mitigating the ranging 
impacts of a changing climate (Bakker & Higgins 2009; Lark et al., 2019). Yet, the Great 
Plains is considered one of the most threatened ecosystems in the world (Hoekstra et al., 
2005).  
 
Figure 1. Changes in grassland acres in the Great Plains ecosystem from 1945-2015. Increases after 
1940 correspond to Dust Bowl recovery and declines after 1960 reflect a combination of government 
policy and the advancement of center-pivot irrigation. The shaded area represents a period of record-
high commodity prices and declining enrollment targets for Farm Bill conservation programs. Adapted 
from “Modeled Historical Land Use and Land Cover for the Conterminous United States,” by T. Sohl, 
R. Reker, M. Bouchard, K. Sayler, J. Dornbierer, S. Wika, R. Quenzer, A. Friesz, 2016, Land Use 








In North America, analyses of the Great Plains grasslands (Hoekstra et al., 2005; 
Wilsey et al., 2019) indicate that more than 50% has been converted for human uses 
(Figure 1). Of the three dominant grassland ecotypes in this region, all have experienced 
significant reductions since the government-sponsored settlement of the region began. 
The tall-grass ecotype now encompasses only 11% of its historic range, followed next by 
mixed grass at 24%, and shortgrass at 54% (Wilsey et al., 2019). The rate of conversion 
in remaining tracts of temperate grasslands is occurring five times faster than what can be 
protected (Lipsey et al., 2015). The shift in some areas is so vast, one study concluded 
that in the late 2000s, it rivaled deforestation rates in the Amazon (Gosnell et al., 2011). 
Given these substantial declines, the Great Plains is considered at risk of losing 
ecological function (Hoekstra et al. 2005). 
Factors Influencing Grassland Conversion 
The Northern Great Plains (Nebraska, North and South Dakota, Montana, and 
Wyoming) is among areas that have experienced some of the most significant changes in 
the past 30 years. Estimates in this region suggest that between 2006-2012, the 
conversion of grasslands occurred at 1-5% per year depending on precise location 
(Claassen et al. 2012; Wright & Wimberly, 2013). By year-end in 2012, Claassen et al. 
(2012) estimated the region accounted for 57% of all domestic grassland to crop 
conversion despite encompassing just 16% of the country’s total grassland acres. In their 
analysis of regional trends, these researchers concluded producers here were “…far more 
likely to convert” grasslands than in other areas of the country (p.46).  
While these recent surges in conversion rates are attributed to price increases of 




coincides with the rapid expansion of the ethanol industry and the lowering of enrollment 
targets for federal conservation programs (Lark et al., 2020). In totality, these conditions 
precipitated the conversion of 53 million acres of Great Plains grasslands (World Wildlife 
Fund, 2020) and one of the most significant land-use change events in US history 
(Wright & Wimberly, 2013). USDA researchers analyzing the aftermath suggested that 
the farm conservation policies enacted alongside economic drivers helped create a 
situation that was counterproductive to the goals of grassland conservation (Claassen et 
al., 2012).  
The relationship between policy and commodity prices during 2008-2012 has 
received considerable attention from researchers (e.g., Lark et al., 2019; Wang et al., 
2017; Wright & Wimberly, 2013). These studies suggest the two factors provided strong 
incentives for conversion because it effectively lowered an individual’s financial risk. An 
analysis of insurance payments from 1994-2013, for example, showed that higher risk 
areas received higher net insurance payments than minimal risk counties (U.S. GAO, 
2015). Additionally, crop insurance policies in unsuitable areas helped reduce the total 
cost of land conversion per acre as some agricultural losses were now guaranteed (Miao 
et al., 2016). This arrangement acted as the catalyst in the eventual conversion of 23 
million acres of grassland, shrubland, and wetlands during this four-year period from 
2008-2011 (Faber et al., 2012).  
If commodities served as the boom, then the bust during this period came from 
impacts to the natural environment. Chief among them, the loss of avifauna (Green et al., 
2005), accruement of significant carbon debt (Fargione et al., 2008), and the runoff of 




One recent assessment of pollinator and waterfowl habitat in the Great Plains by Lark et 
al. (2020) concluded the pervasive encroachment of cropland into lands of high 
conservation value was ongoing, despite the known implications of farming lands that are 
marginally productive and have high yield deficits. Continued conversion of grasslands in 
the Missouri River Basin, for example, has been projected to release 1.7 trillion gallons 
of surface runoff and millions of more pounds of agrichemicals and sediment and serve a 
key driver in the extinction of birds (Green et al., 2005)  
The financial returns made possible by alternate uses of grasslands will 
undoubtedly impact the condition or alteration of the landscape (Rashford et al., 2011). 
However, this implies that any action that increases profitability becomes the single 
motivation for land-use change (Wang et al., 2017). We find this to be succinct, but not 
wholly representative. The agricultural typology literature suggests a variety of factors 
(e.g., age of practitioners, declining regional suppliers, competition for water) exist in 
livestock ranching—often reinforced by markets and policy—that can bring about the 
decisions to convert grasslands (Havstad et al., 2007; Skaggs, 2008; Goldstein, 2011; 
Kennedy et al., 2016). Advances in technology have also played an increasingly larger 
role. Studies report genetically modified, or hybrid seeds have helped drive an increase in 
the amount domestic cropland acres (Wang et al., 2017; Gage et al., 2016). Alterations in 
regional climatic patterns are also expected to further intensify land-use conversion 
trends in the near future (Broch et al., 2013). 
There is a market-based assumption that when commodity prices fall, the amount 
of land converted to produce commodity crops also decreases. This is evidenced by 




to the overall grassland conversion rate. While prices fell following the historic highs of 
2008-2012, further analysis of grassland acreage suggests that the annual rate of 
conversion in the Great Plains stabilized at more than one million acres per year (World 
Wildlife Fund, 2020; Lark et al., 2020). While some of the exacerbating conditions have 
dissipated since 2012 (e.g., commodity prices, adjustment to Farm Bill policy), Lark et al. 
(2019) predict all Great Plains states, regardless of the extent of their remaining 
grasslands, are likely to have increased conversion rates in the future relative to their 
previous baselines acres.  
Conditions in the Livestock Industry 
Profitability is undeniably a driving force for land-use conversion, and the top 
dollar that was once fetched for corn and soybeans can incentivize landowners to bring 
new land into crop production (Rashford et al., 2011; Claassen, 2012; Miao et al., 2016). 
While commodity price increases are rightfully accompanied by concerns about grassland 
conversion, there is also a unique set of conditions in the livestock industry that are 
making it more challenging for ranchers to continue their operations.  
Despite relatively high prices for livestock, for example, the rising input costs of 
feed, transportation, and equipment (Figure 2) can force an operation to diversify or 
outright leave the ranching industry (Gutwein & Goldstein, 2013). If this trend occurs at 
scale, a decline in the number of ranchers per capita can have additional negative 
economic impacts for the remaining ranching community. For instance, if cropping 
systems displace livestock operations, regional suppliers of industry-related services may 
close or relocate because of the tipping point between supply and demand (Rowe et al., 




tenure agreements as rental fees rise alongside competition for high-quality grazing lands 
(Gutwein & Goldstein, 2013).  
 
 
Figure 2. A graphic representation of economic conditions in Nebraska’s ranching industry based 
on USDA Census of Agriculture NAICS economic data from 1987-2007. While the average 
producer’s livestock market value has increased, a corresponding increase in the expenditures to 
raise these animals has kept pace. Meanwhile, the average rancher’s net cash income has not yet 
surpassed $50,000. Adapted from “Census of Agriculture: Nebraska State Level Data 1987 – 
2017,” by US Department of Agriculture, 1987-2019.  
 
Other influences on land-use decisions can be more directly attributed to long-
standing demographics shifts in rural areas. The availability of qualified individuals to 
assist in ranching activities may be reduced as younger generations move and 
experienced ranchers reach retirement age (Gale, 2003; Wachenheim & Lesch, 2014). 
This may bring some or all lands utilized for grazing into crop production to offset the 
workload associated with livestock (Reitsma et al., 2015). Additionally, uncertainty about 
operational succession can increase pressure to dissolve a ranch or transition it to produce 



















policymakers in agriculture who see it as a major loss to both the industry and the 
ecosystem services that are provided as public goods (Tauer, 2017).  
A particularly unique challenge in agriculture is the fluidity of many internal and 
external factors. Our examination of the conservation literature suggests that science, 
technology, society, policy, economics, and climatic conditions can all serve as drivers of 
land-use change (Gage et al., 2016; Claassen et al., 2012; Goldstein et al., 2011; Wang et 
al., 2017). Further, according to Wright and Wimberly (2013), many of these are 
occurring simultaneously:  
A shift from livestock to corn/soy cropping is consistent with a tipping point at 
which increasing rates of return caused by, e.g., rising commodity prices, 
subsidized crop insurance, improved corn and soybean cultivars, and adoption of 
no-till technologies make grassland conversion more profitable than continued 
livestock production (p. 4136). 
The lack of economic linkages between grassland ecosystem services and 
ranching viability is problematic given the cultural and ecological importance of the 
Great Plains ecosystem. While a rancher may be motivated to steward his or her lands to 
ensure operational longevity, their business strategy might not align with an ecosystem-
level conservation approach in service of the public interest (Goldstein et al., 2011). 
Furthermore, even if there were substantial public support for the protection of privately-
owned grasslands, the economic rationale for taxpayer investments has not been 




Ecological Impacts of Grassland Reduction 
Grassland-dependent species like birds help serve as a bellwether for 
understanding the implications of a rapidly changing Great Plains ecosystem. In the past 
50 years, declines exceeding 50% have been observed in at least eight grassland-bird 
populations (Sauer et al., 2014). With et al. (2008) suggest this is underestimated as 
population dynamics of birds are unlikely to keep pace with the recent and rapid cropland 
expansion event of 2008-2012. This uncoupling of landscape dynamics from population 
trends, according to With et al. (2008), suggest that the worst of species declines may not 
currently be realized. The delayed feedback makes species recovery efforts challenging 
not only because of the difficulty in restoring grassland habitat (Wang et al., 2017), but 
because many grassland specialists are known to avoid re-introduced or exotic grasses 
(Davis et al., 2013). 
There are several other negative ecological effects that result from the conversion 
of grasslands to intensive agriculture. As grasslands are removed, associated animal and 
plant communities that service soil productivity or pest control will begin to decline 
(Foley et al. 2005; Green et al., 2005). Simultaneously, stores of ancient, sequestered 
carbon are released (Fargione et al., 2008), soil erosion rates can begin to rise 
(Montgomery, 2007), and water quality in absence of buffering and filtration regimes 
decreases (Moss, 2008). While the development of croplands from grasslands does come 
with modest increases in food production, studies are demonstrating the trade-offs come 
at disproportionate and excessive costs to wildlife (Lark et al., 2020), biodiversity, and 




Turner and Daily (2008) suggest the maintenance of biodiversity, as part of an 
ecosystem management strategy, has many characteristics of what society normally 
recognizes as public goods (e.g., clean water, pollinator services). Therefore, it is 
important to consider, argues Havstad et al. (2007), that grasslands encompass nested 
public and private goods. These goods are made available across a host of temporal and 
spatial ranges (Turner & Daily, 2008). However, the lack of uptake in managing overall 
ecosystem health has left temperate grasslands with the least intact biodiversity of any 
habitat type in the world (Newbold et al., 2016). While it is expected that the delivery of 
ecosystem services declines in absence of biodiversity, the complexity of these 
interactions is not well understood (Mace et al., 2012). 
Assessments of biodiversity and heterogeneity can serve as ecological indicators 
of ecosystem health. Operationally, according to Li and Reynolds (1995), heterogeneity 
can be viewed as a building block of “complexity and/or variability of a system property 
in space and/or time” (p. 280). Biodiversity, for its part and according to West (1993), is 
an assessment of all these blocks simultaneously in “the variety of organisms, their 
genetic differences, and the communities and ecosystems, and landscape patterns in 
which they occur” (p. 3). As grassland areas shift to homogenous structures (commodity 
crops or introduced forage), both heterogeneity and biodiversity can be expected to 
decline. Accompanying these decreases are limitations in the quantity, quality, and 







Ecosystem Services Delivery from Grasslands  
Because concepts such as biodiversity are often abstract and do not readily lend 
themselves to the daily lives of ranchers or the public, a closer examination of the array 
of services provided by grassland ecosystems is warranted. The concept of ecosystem 
services is described by Daily (1997) as “…the actual life-support functions, such as 
cleansing, recycling, and renewal, and they confer many intangible aesthetic and cultural 
benefits as well” (p. 3). These functions fall into four broad categories of services: 
provisioning, regulating, cultural, and supporting (Goldstein et al., 2011).  
The ecosystem services of grasslands (Table 1) vary at vast temporal and spatial 
scales (Power, 2010). As a supporting service, this includes nutrient cycling and soil 
formation. As a provisioning service, grasslands allow access to fresh water, food, fiber, 
and fuel. As a regulatory force, these areas offer pollinator services, maintenance of the 
hydrologic cycle, climate mediation, and waste absorption and processing. Lastly, 
grasslands serve as important cultural icons for many facets of society—offering 
education, aesthetic, spiritual, and recreational opportunities (Skaggs, 2008). In the 
delivery of any service, grasslands are dynamic both in the capacity to produce and 
deliver the aforementioned goods (Havstad et al., 2007). 
The valuation of an ecosystem service rests at the crossroads of sociocultural 
motivations for economic and environmental sustainability (Joshi et al., 2019). In the 
instance of agriculture, both a necessary and dominant form of land management, it will 
both provide and consume ecosystem services (Power, 2010). For example, management 
activities may prioritize soil erosion and nutrient retention over the possible extinction of 




consumption of ecosystem services depends on the management of short-term and long-
term objectives (Power, 2010). Determining how to best achieve the co-production of 
agricultural goods and ecosystem services through management is of growing and urgent 
interest in the grasslands (Boughton et al., 2019) 
Table 1. Examples of Ecosystem Services Derived from Grasslands 
Ecosystem service Definition Examples 
Provisioning    
Food   
Crops Plants cultivated for humans or 
managed animals 
Hay, alfalfa, corn, cattle 
Livestock  Animals raised for 
consumption 
Cattle, sheep 
Wild foods  Edible plants or animals 
harvested from the wild 
Elk, deer, antelope 
Fiber   
Wood-based  Products made from harvested 
trees 
Firewood 




Air quality Emitting or extracting 
chemicals from atmosphere 




Influence of grasslands on 
global climate 
Grasses and soils capture 
carbon dioxide 
Water regulation Timing and magnitude of water 
runoff, flooding, recharge, etc. 
Playa lakes recharge aquifers 
Water purification Filtering pollution, 
decomposition of waste, etc. 
Wetlands filter waste 
Erosion regulation Role vegetation cover plays in 
soil retention 
Grass prevents soil loss 
Disease regulation Role of grasslands on incidence 
of pathogens 
Control of mosquitoes 




Ecosystem service Definition Examples 
 
Crop pollination Transferring pollen from 
female to male flowers 
Bees pollinate nearby crops 
Pest regulation Role of ecosystems in 
prevalence of pests 
Bats consume bugs  
Natural hazard regulation Reducing damage from natural 
disasters 
Vegetation reduces flood 
damage 
Cultural services   
Recreation Pleasure derived from outdoor 
activities 
Hunting, bird watching 
Aesthetic and spiritual 
values 
Inspiration derived from nature Sense of awe, viewsheds 
 
Maintenance of traditional 
lifestyles 
Role of ecosystems in 
supporting traditional ranching 
activities 
Ranch livestock and 
stewardship activities 




Nutrient cycling Role of ecosystems in nutrient 
flow and recycling 
Decomposition of organic 
matter contributes to fertility 
Primary production Formation of biological 
material by plants through 
photosynthesis 
Algae in wetlands 
Water cycling Flow of water through 
ecosystems 
Transfer of water from soil to 
plants to air, and air to rain 
 
Note. Adapted from “Beef and beyond: Paying for ecosystem services on Western US rangelands,” 
by J. H. Goldstein, C. K. Presnall, L. López-Hoffman, G. P Nabhan, R. L. Knight, G.B. Ruyle, and 
T.P. Toombs, 2011, Rangelands, 33, p. 6. Copyright 2011 by the Society for Range Management.  
  
Goldstein et al. (2011) suggest that while ranchers do have an inherent interest in 
the long-term stewardship of grasslands, the lack of economic linkages to the public 
goods that are produced creates inconsistency in the supply and demand of these services. 
For example, in absence of market continuity, ranchers need only to consider self-interest 




otherwise build on services like biodiversity (Turner & Daily, 2008). Establishing 
market-based mechanisms to better account for the unseen, but critical services 
grasslands provide is seen as one conceivable way to achieve a balance between 
delivering ecosystem services and the production of agricultural goods (Gutwein & 
Goldstein, 2013).  
Frameworks to Deliver Grassland Ecosystem Services  
Because private landowners steward half of the remaining grasslands in the 
country, it would seem plausible that declines in grassland acreage are due to a lack of 
applicable markets or conservation options. Another explanation may reside in the 
frameworks used in conservation or commodity markets. According to Bennett et al. 
(2017), one issue is that federal policy and conservation strategies often overlook the 
societal conditions from which land alterations arise. While there is an assumption that 
federal conservation programs deliver positive social outcomes (Burton et al., 2008), 
research in long-term participation and the persistence of incentivized management 
activities is notably lacking (Dayer et al., 2018). 
Another consideration is that many conservation efforts tend to limit the scope of 
management to only the needs of certain species (Greene, 2005). Despite knowledge of 
the importance of biodiversity and social/cultural ties to land use, narrow financial 
incentive programs are usually offered as the sole solution (Sorice & Donlan, 2015). 
Furthermore, stakeholder involvement in the design and implementation of these 
programs is usually limited to informal engagement or public commenting processes 
(Santo et al., 2015). A participant-focused approach to conservation has been put forth for 




reflects a belief in the social sciences that human dimension research is not thoroughly 
incorporated into the design phase of program development (Sanquist et al., 2010).   
Sorice & Donlan (2015) argue that today’s conservation efforts may realize 
greater benefits by seeking ways to “explicitly incorporate potential participants’ needs” 
(p. 788) into program design. The researchers suggest this approach is better viewed as a 
nudge rather than a direct financial incentive. Such an approach not only incorporates 
stakeholder feedback, but it allows the design and administration of the program by its 
participants to generate more predictable benefits and costs (Santo et al., 2015). This may 
lead to greater confidence among participants and non-participants since programs were 
developed in a collaborative manner (Sorice & Donlan, 2015). As trust is reported as a 
key component in rancher collaborations (Sliwinski et al., 2018), bottom-up approaches 
that can offer first-hand accounts of the experience are necessary to increase ranchers’ 
participation (Kennedy, 2018). 
 
Figure 3. Model for persistence in conservation programs. As payments end, non-pecuniary 
incentives that elicit intrinsically motivated behavior become more important to ensure the 
conservation practice is continued. Adapted from “Private Landowner Conservation Behavior 
Following Participation in Voluntary Incentive Programs: Recommendations to Facilitate 
Behavioral Persistence,” by A. Dayer, S. Lutter, K. Sesser, C. Hickey, and T. Gardali, 2018, 
Conservation Letters, 11, p. 3. Copyright 2018 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.  
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Another design consideration is how incentives (i.e., payments) affect the long-
term adoption of conservation practices. Sorice and Donlan (2015) note the overemphasis 
on financial incentives stems from a misguided perspective that money is the binding 
agent for long-term behavior change (Van Vugt, 2009; Ferraro & Kiss, 2002). A 
sustained behavior in this study is referred to as persistence (Figure 3): the continuation 
of a practice when financial incentives end (Dayer et al., 2018). Conceptually, persistence 
has application to conservation program design as it seeks to produce cost-effective, 
long-term conservation outcomes. Within the current body of research, however, the 
understanding of how and why landowners engage in conservation practices over time is 
lacking (Reimer et al., 2014).  
When a participant perceives a conservation program as supportive rather than 
controlling, however, the intrinsic motivations of the participant are less likely to be 
crowded out (Frey & Jegen, 2001). Behaviors that are internally motivated (i.e., not 
directly resulting from compensatory payments) are likely to be sustained over time, 
addressing issues regarding cost-effectiveness and persistence of management practices 
(Ryan & Deci, 2000; DeCaro & Stokes, 2008). If billions of dollars are to remain 
invested in Farm Bill conservation programs (USDA ERS, 2016) it would make fiscal 
sense to pursue design considerations that attempt to address behavioral persistence when 
the payments end (Dayer et al., 2018).  
Emerging Grassland Markets: Payment for Ecosystem Services 
In the US, a range of strategies has been used to influence land-use practices. The 
first federal programs were aimed to combat Dust Bowl era soil erosion. Later, these 




morphed to reduce risk and expand ecosystem conservation (Cain & Lovejoy, 2004). The 
latest innovations have sought to integrate private investments, creating market-based 
solutions such as carbon trading, wetland banking, and biodiversity credits (Pirard, 2012). 
However, two of the largest challenges for grassland conservation have been the adoption 
of practices at scale and persistence of management activities beyond the length of the 
incentive (Augustine et al., 2019).  
The incorporation of market-based instruments to improve conservation outcomes 
in grasslands is underway in Wyoming (Hansen et al., 2018), California (Buckley Biggs 
et al., 2021), and Colorado (Gutwein & Goldstein, 2013). Payment for ecosystem 
services (PES) has been offered as one solution to create more beneficial outcomes for 
ranchers’ livelihoods, grassland ecosystems, and for society (Cheatum et al., 2011). PES 
programs target a broad array of services that can be managed by private landowners to 
enhance the delivery of ecosystem services often considered to be nested public goods 
(Garbach et al., 2012). Gutwein and Goldstein (2013) suggest that the creation of these 
“environmental markets” may enhance opportunities for land managers to align 
operational goals, financial strategies, and conservation outcomes.  
PES programs can also be categorized as an environmental subsidy, a policy 
intervention, and a commodities exchange rolled into one (Engel et al., 2008). Incentives 
offered to landowners, based on conditional delivery of predetermined services and/or the 
actions required to deliver those services, are a fixture in PES programs (Hansen et al., 
2018). A unique and important feature of PES, as indicated by Gosnell et al. (2011), is 
that the suite of services to be sold follows traditional commodity behavior. Landowners 




choosing. Normally included are also provisions of “additionality” (services delivered are 
higher than they would be in absence of the practice) and “avoided loss” (acreage 
reductions are prevented under business-as-usual scenarios (Gutwein & Goldstein, 2013). 
PES contracts stipulate the rule-making rights as well as how new practices can 
be created or modified. Building in this flexibility not only increases landowner 
satisfaction but it also increases program participation (Gosnell et al., 2011). 
Additionally, PES contracts are often not individual agreements between buyer and 
seller, but by a third-party or cooperative that can better serve the needs of contractual 
design and reporting (Gosnell et al., 2011). This has obvious benefits in terms of 
aggregating participant impacts for higher rates of return, but it would reduce the 
likelihood any one individual can influence a set of management rules or make 
modifications (Larson et al., 2010; Wunder, 2013).  
There is agreement that sound natural resource management accounts for past and 
present ecologic function, human influences, and a basic understanding of the socio-
economic values of the system to be managed (Dietz et al., 2003; Berkes & Turner, 2006; 
Hayes et al., 2014). However, less attention is given to the role local knowledge and 
preferences should play in the design of conservation policy or programs (Clements et al., 
2010; Petheram & Campbell, 2010) An important distinction of PES programs is that 
stakeholders can engage at various levels of the process. Using collaborative processes 
can assist in debunking the notion that conservation is incongruent with agriculture and 
can lead to increased participation (Sorice et al., 2011). In this respect, PES may be more 
advantageous than similar programs as it can build social capital by paying for results 




participant livelihoods with the rulemaking and compliance of conservation programs, 
resource managers are more likely to adopt practices to sustain the resource system 
(Persha et al., 2011; Hellin & Schrader, 2003; Schlager & Ostrom, 1992). 
Even when programmatic design and participation are in alignment, adoption may 
be limited if there is an inability to make program modifications at an individual level 
(Cheatum et al., 2011; Hayes et al., 2014; Hansen et al., 2018). One solution utilized by 
Ostrom (1990) for communally managed systems, was to propose a set of design 
principles utilized in other successful programming, then allow for stakeholders to make 
and modify these when establishing a program framework. This, according to Hayes et al. 
(2014) is consistent with findings on why resource managers are more likely to adopt 
new management practices or sustain existing ones.  
If mutually beneficial outcomes in conservation are to be achieved, Hayes et al. 
(2014) also note the sociocultural drivers of land-use conversion should receive robust 
consideration. The assumption that a direct economic incentive alone, facilitated through 
a conditionality clause, will be a sufficient pro-environmental response may not be 
wholly accurate when we examine the total area of grasslands that are converted each 
year. Studies in ranching have shown that family, tradition, lifestyle, connection to the 
land, and amenity values are strong motivations for ranching (Gutwein & Goldstein, 
2013; Havstad et al., 2007; Gosnell & Travis, 2005). Additional research has also shown 
that while profitability is a factor, is not necessarily the primary driver for decisions in 
ranching (Smith & Martin, 1972; Gentner & Tanaka, 2002).  
The true potential of PES, according to Toombs et al. (2011), is that these 




healthy grasslands through sustainable livestock ranching. Because ranchers engage in 
rearing livestock for several reasons, conservation policy that relies on the imperfect 
assumption that a practitioner's motivations are exclusively driven by economic self-
interest is likely to overlook opportunities for behavioral persistence and increased 





CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY 
This study conducted an ex-ante conjoint choice experiment to measure Nebraska 
ranchers’ preferences for attributes commonly found in payment for ecosystem programs 
(PES). For the purposes of this research, “ranchers” refer to cattle producers who own or 
rent native grassland in the state. Our research was informed by the work of Hansen et al. 
(2018) who focused on PES with ranchers in Wyoming. Ranchers for this study were 
recruited through a variety of traditional and nontraditional methods due to the COVID-
19 pandemic and health safety protocols. Accordingly, the survey was only available to 
participants through an online survey platform.  
Limitations to in-person gatherings increased our reliance on stakeholder-based 
organizations such as the Nebraska Cattlemen Association to assist with rancher 
recruitment for the study. Based on their membership information, we sent invitations to 
participate in the survey through email, text, and postcards to ranchers operating cow/calf 
pairs in the state (n=1,548) during two outreach attempts. Additionally, we procured a 
mailing list from a third-party vendor to send postcard invitations directly to ranchers. 
Parameters of ranchers engaged in cow/calf operations, on improved pasture or 
grasslands, of at least 50 acres or more (n=5,743) were selected. These individuals 
received two postcards (one invitation, one reminder) requesting their participation in the 
study. We also disseminated invitations for participation through social media, electronic 
newsletters, and media outlets. With the outreach information that was quantifiable, we 
determined our study sample to represent 7,291 ranchers in Nebraska.  
Limits to in-person gatherings led us to forego all attempts at face-to-face data 




(Qualtrics) for a duration of 8-weeks. Our objective was to reach ranchers operating in 
Nebraska, with various levels of expertise, and different operational capacities. However, 
determining rancher typology from the limited information we could gather was a 
challenge. Therefore, we found it appropriate to examine known demographic 
information about ranchers in Nebraska based on the USDA’s (2019) Census of 
Agriculture, using the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) standard. 
This system is the federal statistical standard by which agencies such as the USDA 
classify a variety of industries, including many of those involved in agriculture.  
Using techniques outlined in conjoint choice research, we quantified choice set 
data to assess marketplace behavior regarding rancher acceptance of PES program 
attributes. Conjoint choice experiments (CCE), related to conjoint analysis according to 
Yong (2004), can be traced to random utility theory, discrete choice analysis, and choice 
modeling. CCE differs from conjoint analysis in that it directly elicits respondent 
preferences in an effort to better understand the complexities of how products are valued 
(Louviere & Woodworth, 1983). CCE is sometimes referred to as a discrete choice 
experiment, but there are noteworthy differences described in the literature. A closer 
review of these techniques can be found in Louviere et al. (2010).  
Attributes in this research refer to the variables that encompass the structural 
makeup of each hypothetical PES choice set. Study participants were tasked with 
evaluating a series of choice sets and selecting the most preferred alternative. This 
allowed us to quantify the perceived value of each attribute with the resulting data 
informing its “utility” (Yong, 2004). Utility refers to an attribute’s relative worth, which 




increased utility. These utilities are useful for conducting preference simulations, 
revealing an overall preference share for a PES attribute among study participants. We 
find this to be one of the primary advantages of CCE as the utility reflects “trade-offs” 
participants must make when formulating decisions that will affect their ranching 
operations (Yong, 2004). 
The variables that were tested in the hypothetical PES programs were based on 
the structure of those found in USDA conservation programs. Offerings such as the 
Conservation Stewardship Program are contractual, encompassing a management 
activity, compensatory payment, and a length of time for which the arrangement is valid 
(US GAO, 2007). The contract length and payment level attributes used were based on 
the model study and our feasibility analysis with ranchers, natural resource professionals, 
and farm policy experts. The management attributes we tested were derived from 
recommendations put forth in the state’s wildlife management plan: the Nebraska Natural 
Legacy Project (Schneider et al., 2011).  
 
Note. Contract variables for length (3) and year (6) were adapted from offerings currently found in Farm 
Bill conservation programs. The variables (16) tested for the management attribute were adapted from the 
Nebraska Natural Legacy Project (Schneider et al., 2011). This resulted in a total of 288 possible choice 
combinations. 
 
The resulting attributes and variables (Table 2) in aggregate consisted of 288 
choice combinations that were possible (16 management; 6 payment levels; 3 contract 
lengths). Because of this, we utilized an incomplete confounded factorial design to arrive 
Table 2. Choice Combinations Based on Contract, Payment, and Management Attributes  
 
Attribute Variables tested 
Contract length (years) 5, 10, 20 
Payment levels (dollars/acre) 5, 25, 50, 100, 250, 500 
Management actions 
Total 





at the choice sets for testing. A common challenge with CCE, one that we address 
through incomplete confounded factorial methodology, is it asks participants to rate the 
entirety of attributes present. In this case, reviewing all 288 program profiles would result 
in survey fatigue and the emergence of bias in a rancher’s selection (Yong et al., 2010). 
An incomplete factorial design allows us to narrow the total number of profiles presented 
to a participant, while still testing the main effects of management, payment length, 
contract duration, and lower order interactions among the three. This technique allows us 
to elicit responses that are free from subject effect (Kanmongne & Eskridge, 2013).  
Survey respondents were assigned to review the choice sets in one factorial array 
(i.e., block) as a side-by-side comparison of two program profiles. This study examined 
128 choice combinations that were represented across eight factorial blocks. These eight 
blocks were constructed to ensure an even distribution of data across the experiment, 
allowing us the ability to examine how the three attributes affected participant choices. 
Within each block, subjects were presented with eight choice sets in which to select their 
preferred program offering. If a subject did not prefer either program or was unsure about 
their intentions regarding a choice set, they could select neither.  
Participants were also asked a brief series of demographic questions (Table 3) to 
obtain baseline information about respondents and relative locations in the state. For our 
purposes, ranchers of all experience levels and operational classifications were of 
interest. However, one screening question was included to allow those not involved in 
cattle ranching to self-select out of the survey. As previously discussed, incomplete 
confounded factorial designs are not conducive to a full estimation of treatment 




significance of payment levels, contract lengths, and management actions on preferences, 
we did not examine correlations of these demographic variables on the programmatic 
variables we selected for testing. 







code(s) are most 
of these lands 
located? 
How many years 
have you raised 
and managed 
grazing animals? 
How would you 
describe the acres 
your animals 
graze on?  
How many acres 




Note. To address survey fatigue and anticipated low response rates, this study was narrow in the 
demographic information collected. These questions were developed through our feasibility 
analysis within the ranching and natural resources communities.  
 
A noteworthy difference between this research and the model study was in the 
management attributes that were tested. Hansen et al. (2018) feasibility analysis drew 
upon direct consultation with various stakeholders in a targeted study area. For this 
research, which sought to establish a baseline for management across a much larger 
geographic region (the state of Nebraska), we adopted management strategies that already 
received considerable stakeholder review from the Nebraska Natural Legacy Project 
(NNLP). Of additional relevance was NNLP’s emphasis on accentuating biodiversity, a 
key indicator on the delivery of ecosystem services (Mace et al., 2012; Freese et al., 




Table 4. Nebraska Natural Legacy Project’s Conservation Actions to Address Barriers to 
Conservation and Stresses Affecting Species and Habitats 
 
Actions Related to Fire 
1. For select grasslands, use patch-burn grazing and other grazing systems that combine the 
interaction of fire and grazing to mimic pre-settlement disturbances.  
Actions Related to Grazing/Haying 
2.  Use diverse grazing/haying systems on private and public lands that enhance biological 
diversity and sustain natural communities. Initiate research that evaluates the effectiveness 
and profitability of biological diversity-friendly grazing/haying systems (e.g., reduced 
stocking rates, rotational systems). 
3. Develop and distribute a “best management practices” guide on grazing that can be used to 
improve management of grasslands and riparian areas for biological diversity. Include 
information on sources of technical information, funding programs, wildlife-friendly 
fencing specifications, etc. 
4. Support diverse haying strategies (e.g., on wet meadows) that stagger timing and height of 
cutting, promote increased plant and animal diversity, and avoid peak nesting periods for 
grassland birds. 
5. Promote the use and availability of locally adapted native seed sources for pasture and 
rangeland seedings. 
6. Promote livestock grazing/haying systems that have built-in drought management 
contingencies (e.g., grass banking). 
Actions Related to Hydrology 
7. Promote and provide incentives for the use of wildlife-friendly conservation buffers, 
grassed waterways, sediment traps, etc. on lands adjacent to wetlands, rivers, streams, 
reservoirs, and lakes to prevent siltation and protect water quality.  
8. Promote the development and use of water conservation measures such as more water-
efficient irrigation systems, xeriscape landscaping, water-conserving appliances, etc. 
9. Use and promote restoration and management techniques that utilize native, locally adapted 
species whenever possible. Discourage the use of non-native species in 
restoration/management projects. Encourage private seed companies to provide local-
ecotype seed and harvesting and planting services.  
10. Renovate aquatic habitats by removing introduced rough fish to improve water quality, 
enhance aquatic vegetation and increase biological diversity. | Seek measures that prevent 
the introduction, breeding, and use of potentially invasive non-native species by nurseries, 
hatcheries, universities, etc.  
Actions Needed to Reduce Habitat Fragmentation 
11. Discourage the placement of woody plantings and food plots within natural grassland 
communities, especially when it will result in increased fragmentation.  
12. Provide incentives to private landowners to maintain natural habitats and to cooperatively 




13. Seek to remove or create bypass structures around dams and other impediments that restrict 
the natural movement of aquatic species.  
Actions Needed to Reduce the Impacts of Pollution 
14. Promote the practice of integrated pest management (e.g., non-chemical controls such as 
biocontrol and tillage, spot spraying) through outreach and incentives to minimize impacts 
to biological diversity. 
15. Implement and seek funding for conservation practices such as filter strips, grassed 
waterways, sediment control basins, and grassed buffers to minimize the effects of 
fertilizers and pesticides on wetlands, streams, rivers, and reservoirs.  
16. Work with agricultural and conservation partners to prioritize installation of conservation 
buffers, conservation tillage practices, etc. within watersheds where benefits to biological 
diversity would be highest. 
17. Promote management practices that limit the impacts of nutrients, sedimentation, bacteria, 
and pesticides to help protect water quality. Examples include nutrient application on 
cropland, sediment control on construction sites, incentives for organic farming and low-
chemical farming, etc. 
 
Note. Only 16 of the 17 management recommendations were tested as two closely related variables 
were combined to reduce the total number of choice sets. Adapted from “The Nebraska Natural Legacy 
Project: State Wildlife Action Plan,” by R. Schneider, K. Stoner, G. Steinauer, M. Panella, and M. 
Humpert, 2011.  
 
The statistical analysis that was employed in this study is based on McFadden’s 
(1974) utility model of consumer choice. This was modified to include the random block 
effects where each respondent is randomly assigned to one and only one block 
(Kanmongne & Eskridge, 2013). Specifically, the consumer choice utility is described as: 
Uijkl = vijkl + εijkl  
where: 
           Uijkl = the utility to subject l who chooses alternative (profile) i in choice-set j 
within block k;  
         Vijkl = the predictor component of the utility; and 




Here the predictor vijkl is linear in the parameters and to account for correlation among 
responses within subjects, it is expressed as a mixed-effect model: 
 vijkl = x’ijkl β + Z’ijkl u 
where: 
         x’ijkl = a vector of attribute levels, 
         β = a vector of parameter coefficients for the fixed effects, 
         Z’ijkl = a classification vector for the random effects, and 
         u = a vector of random subject effects. 
Since the choices are multinomial (choice 1 or 2 or neither), a multinomial logit link 
function with the base as the "neither" category (C) will be used as the response of which 
the predictor was a mixed linear model with the factors as the fixed effects and the blocks 
as the random effects. Specifically,  
Logit (pijkl  / pcjkl )  =   vijkl = x’ijkl β + Z’ijkl u 
 where pijkl  = is the probability that an alternative (profile) i in choice-set j within                      
 fraction k is chosen by a random subject l. 
The logit model above is a generalized linear mixed model and was fit with SAS 
Proc Glimmix to test for main effects and first-order interactions of the attributes. See 
Kanmogne and Eskridge (2013) for more details on the statistical analyses of confounded 







CHAPTER 4: RESULTS AND FINDINGS 
Using NAICS (North American Industry Classification System) estimates 
referenced in the USDA’s (2019) Census of Agriculture, our sample population 
constituted 63% of the 11,551 ranches engaged in cattle production on grasslands in 
Nebraska. Over the 8-week survey period, we registered 251 completed surveys from 
producers—a 3.5% response rate of our study’s sample population. Our geographic 
assessment (Figure 3) shows respondents were primarily operating in north-central 
Nebraska (Sandhills region), one of the largest contiguous grasslands in the Great Plains. 
In comparison to NAICS data about Nebraska’s ranchers, we found our sample 
population to be reflective of many of the core demographic characteristics outlined. For 
example, across categories such as ownership, total acres grazed, type of grazing, and 
average experience, we find the responses in our sample to mirror statewide trends. For 
example, 52% of participants reported owning grazing lands utilized in their operation 
with 77% having more than 20 years of experience. NAICS survey data indicates that 
54% of ranchers reported owning the lands they grazed and 74% had 11+ years of 
experience. In comparing the type of lands grazed, we find similar trends with survey 
78% of respondents reporting they grazed rangeland compared to 84% of those in the 






Figure 4. Locations where ranchers had grazing animals, reported by zip code. Up to five zip codes 
per rancher were allowed. 
 
Ranchers self-identified across many of the demographic classifications that were 
presented (Table 5). A majority of ranchers in this study reported having 20+ years of 
experience (77%) while conducting their ranching activities on native grasslands (78%). 
There was a mix in ownership type with 52% reporting they owned the land they grazed, 
and 33% reporting they utilized a combination of ownership and rentals to manage their 
herds. No participants utilized grazing allotments on federal or state land, mirroring the 
larger trend of private land ownership in Nebraska. Additionally, producers represented 
many different operational capacities. Approximately 48% of ranchers reported they 
utilized 1,000 acres or more and 88% of all respondents were involved in activities on 










Table 5. Demographic Comparison of Nebraska Ranchers Using PES Survey Responses 








(n = 11,551) 










































Ranch by size (acres)  Ranch by size (acres)  
0 to 5 
6 to 20 
21 to 50 
51 to 100 
101 to 200 
201 to 500 











0 to 9 
10 to 49 
50 to 69 
70 to 99 
100 to 139 
140 to 179 
180 to 219 
220 to 259 
260 to 499 
500 to 999 
















Note. Data represented as a percentage share of total unless otherwise noted. USDA Census (2019) data 
utilizes NAICS beef cattle ranching and farming standard. Some classifications differ based on parameter 
assessments used by the respective studies. 
 
Our experimental model detected an indifference for many of the attributes and 
variables that were tested. Management attributes, however, were found to have a highly 
significant effect (p<0.0001) on respondents’ preferences for a given program (Table 6). 
This was observed in Type III tests of fixed effects where preference share of 




an analysis of payment levels and contract lengths, neither had a significant effect on the 
respondent’s preference for the choice sets that were presented. This indicates there was a 
level of indifference to every individual payment or contract attribute regarding 
participation in our grassland payment for ecosystem services program.  









Pr > F 
Management 15 12.34 <.0001 
Payment 5 0.70 0.6197 
Contract length 2 0.28 0.7540 
Payment & length 10 1.65 0.0866 
Note. Management actions as an attribute class were found to have significant effects on the rancher 
preferences for any given choice set. Treatment effects considered significant at p< .05.  
 
In the broader context of the 16 management practices tested, 61% of participants 
preferred management actions that were tied to practices known to improve biological 
diversity such as reduced stocking rate, rotational grazing, stockpiling (Table 7). 
Conversely, the least preferred practices were related to the management of water 
resources on the ranch. Approximately 8% of respondents suggested they were willing to 
remove structures that restricted water movement or remove species or vegetation that 
had been introduced. Further, participants did not appear to have strong interests in 


























Use a grazing practice to improve biodiversity -0.4859 0.1030 -4.72       61.52  .06337 
Use grazing/haying systems with built-in 
drought management  
-0.8611 0.1168 -7.37       42.27  .04936 
Utilize native, locally adapted species in 
restoration/management projects 
-0.8789 0.1412 -6.23       41.52  .05863 
Use a combination of grazing and prescribed fire 
to benefit wildlife or habitat  
-0.8946 0.1200 -7.46       40.88  .04905 
Remove or discontinue woody plantings within 
grasslands or improved pasture 
-0.9198 0.1130 -8.14       39.86  .04503 
Use adapted native seed sources for pasture and 
grassland seeding 
-1.0427 0.1256 -8.30       35.25  .04428 
Incorporate wildlife-friendly fencing in 
grasslands and riparian areas 
-1.2461 0.1371 -9.09       28.76  .03944 
Manage grasslands in cooperation with other 
large blocks of habitat to conserve wildlife 
-1.2468 0.1484 -8.40       28.74  .04264 
Stagger timing or height of haying to increase 
plant and animal diversity  
-1.4220 0.1400 -10.16       24.12  .03376 
Practice integrated pest management to enhance 
biodiversity 
-1.4559 0.1546 -9.42       23.32 .03605 
Upgrade or install water conservation measures  -1.5097 0.1457 -10.36       22.10  .03220 
Reduce nutrient and insecticide applications to 
protect water quality 
-1.5154 0.1519 -9.98       21.97  .03337 
Implement filter strips, grassed waterways, etc. 
to minimize the effects of fertilizers and 
pesticides on wetlands and waterways 
-1.7263 0.1635 -10.56       17.79  .02910 
Incorporate wildlife-friendly conservation 
buffers for waterways to prevent siltation  
-1.7858 0.1633 -10.94       16.77  .02738 
Remove structures that restrict the natural 
movement of aquatic species  
-2.4792 0.2379 -10.42       8.381  .01994 
Remove introduced “rough fish” or aquatic 
vegetation to improve water quality 
-2.4913 0.2260 -11.02       8.28  .01872 
 
Note. Least squares means converted to percentage share. A mean value near 33.0 would demonstrate 





In an examination of lower-order interactions among contract length and payment 
level, we did not detect significance among these attribute classes or the variables that 
were tested (Table 8). Additionally, no specific themes about program configurations 
were apparent (i.e., low payment, short contract length). A leading trend among ranchers 
in this study was the use of high payments and longer lengths, however, these preferences 
were not statistically significant among the ranchers we surveyed.    













































































Payment and Length       
$5 per acre for 5 years -1.5431 0.1709 3613 -9.03 0.2137 0.03652 
$5 per acre for 10 years -1.5354 0.1689 3613 -9.09 0.2154 0.03637 
$5 per acre for 20 years -1.5822 0.1679 3613 -9.42 0.2055 0.03450 
$25per acre for 5 years -1.9399 0.1819 3613 -10.67 0.1437 0.02614 
$25 per acre for 10 years -1.4543 0.1711 3613 -8.50 0.2336 0.03996 
$25 per acre for 20 years -1.7342 0.2213 3613 -7.84 0.1765 0.03906 
$50 per acre for 5 years -1.6341 0.1710 3613 -9.56 0.1951 0.03337 
$50 per acre for 10 years -1.5777 0.1815 3613 -8.69 0.2064 0.03747 
$50 per acre for 20 years -1.7286 0.1701 3613 -10.16 0.1775 0.03021 
$100 per acre for 5 years -1.5186 0.1594 3613 -9.53 0.2190 0.03492 
$100 per acre for 10 years -1.4189 0.1832 3613 -7.75 0.2420 0.04433 
$100 per acre for 20 years -1.6231 0.1953 3613 -8.31 0.1973 0.03854 
$250 per acre for 5 years -1.4886 0.1581 3613 -9.41 0.2257 0.03569 
$250 per acre for 10 years -1.9635 0.1976 3613 -9.94 0.1404 0.02773 
$250 per acre for 20 years -1.4218 0.1751 3613 -8.12 0.2413 0.04224 
$500 per acre for 5 years -1.7343 0.2168 3613 -8.00 0.1765 0.03828 
$500 per acre for 10 years -1.5418 0.1831 3613 -8.42 0.2140 0.03919 
$500 per acre for 20 years -1.4250 0.1978 3613 -7.21 0.2405 0.04756 
Note. Pr > |t| = <.0001. Least squares means results based on the experimental model. A mean value near 
>.33 demonstrates indifference for a given level of an attribute. No variables within payment, contract 





CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION AND RESEARCH NEEDS 
Ranchers must account for a growing number of influences if they are to remain 
successful in the livestock industry. Grassland conservation programs are no different. 
Government policy, commodity markets, information networks, technology 
advancements, and other factors may all contribute to a rancher’s decision to convert 
native grasslands to alternative uses. However, our study suggests that the significance of 
financial incentives used to influence those decisions may be overemphasized.  
Few in the livestock or natural resources sectors would argue that compensatory 
payments are not enticing features to offer ranchers engaged in conservation. However, 
what we found in the literature and confirmed in our study was its importance may be 
overstated. In the attributes we tested–management, contract length, and payment level–
only management variables were found to have significant effects on a rancher’s 
preference for any given payment for ecosystem services (PES) program. This finding 
was similarly evidenced in the model study by Hansen et al. (2018), where ranchers self-
reported that the nature of the management action and its intended outcomes were of 
higher importance than the payment level. 
Analysis of the relationships among contract lengths and payment levels also 
yielded no conclusive evidence of the importance to ranchers who participated. Together, 
these findings suggest the need to offer conservation programs that reflect the challenges 
of cattle ranching in a natural grassland system. This might also indicate, as the literature 





This research also provides important clues in how conservation programs can be 
developed and discussed with ranchers moving forward. For example, using biodiversity 
both as a metric and a tool for private land conservation. What we discovered is that of all 
16 management actions we tested, using grazing to conserve biodiversity was preferred 
over all other possible program options. This suggests not only that biodiversity is a 
recognized term within Nebraska’s ranching community, but it also indicates ranchers see 
biodiversity as a management strategy that can coexist with the core business of livestock 
production.  
In a closer examination of the least preferred management actions, we found the 
lowest to all to be related to the management of water. This is problematic given water’s 
importance in agriculture, conservation, and society. Because our work shows that 
biodiversity is becoming more familiar conceptually within the ranching community, a 
conservation program offering like PES might look for more ways to specifically address 
biodiversity needs in relation to aquatic resource management. For example, rather than 
consultations on individual impaired species, it may be more effective to highlight the 
overall net decline of the aquatic ecosystem and what these declines tell us about water 
quality and landscape health. 
It is important to note that there will also be trade-offs to consider in relation to 
ecosystem service production. For example, raising livestock as a provisioning service 
may at times conflict with others like pest regulation or pollinator services. To be 
successful, detection and monitoring must be rigorous to ensure the supply of ecosystem 
services remains constant and is not prioritized for the delivery of any single service. Not 




ecosystem services, but these programs need to enhance profitability and demonstrate 
congruency with ranching lifestyles.  
Our review of the literature also sheds light on the need for PES and other 
conservation programs to create more intentional feedback loops with ranchers. Local 
participation and decision-making ability are particularly attractive to ranchers, but 
notably absent in many of today’s conservation offerings (Donlan, 2015). A robust PES 
program would incorporate stakeholder involvement at several levels (i.e., program 
design, price negotiations, satisfaction surveys, etc.). This approach mirrors principles 
laid out in human-centered design and persistence frameworks, ensuring those charged 
with stewarding natural resources are also protected with technology transfer, financial 
investment, and localized decision-making ability. With these elements present in the 
correct proportion, programmatic satisfaction will remain high and bring about the best 
possibility of behavioral persistence if the option to participate in PES markets remains 
constant.  
The success of a PES program will in part be based on the ability to first meet the 
needs of livestock producers, then align with other conservation outcomes, and conclude 
the arrangement with the eventual sale of the ecosystem service (Hansen et al., 2018). In 
any phase, these programs will see additional benefits by emphasizing ranchers' roles as 
ecosystem stewards, educating the public and other landowners about the services and 
marketing opportunities that healthy grasslands provide (Gutwein & Goldstein, 2013). In 
some cases, PES programs will need to align with pre-existing arrangements or even be 




possess an understanding of local dynamics and support a rancher’s freedom of choice in 
conjunction with their quality of life (Sorice & Donlan, 2015).  
Shortcomings of PES Application 
 There are several concerns about the real-world application of PES programs. 
There is a philosophical debate: the potential of ecosystems to be engineered for only the 
most profitable/beneficial services (Redford & Adams, 2009). There are critiques of 
relevance, ensuring program design and implementation are a net gain for a rancher’s 
bottom line (Didier & Brunson, 2004). There are also questions about fairness and 
profiteering among the ecosystem service sellers, suggesting that “someone’s getting rich 
off of [ranchers]” (Gosnell et al., 2011, p. 23). Conversely, a publicly-funded approach 
may create the perception that PES programs are a social safety net for ranchers (Gutwein 
& Goldstein, 2013). Further yet, there are several examples in the US and abroad where 
conservation programs were designed in ways that did little to ensure that conservation of 
species or resources would occur (Wunder, 2006).  
Another area of concern surrounds the integration of money and policy. Research 
has noted that while financial incentives can increase the adoption of a new practice, it 
does not always lead to the retention of the technique when payments end. Hayes et al. 
(2014) point to interdisciplinary studies in psychology, agricultural policy, and 
economics that show directly incentivized conservation can produce short-term gains that 
may be followed by unintended, long-term consequences (Cardenas et al., 2000; Hellin & 
Schrader, 2003; Grothmann & Patt, 2005; Vignola et al., 2010). For example, without 
careful compliance measures, revenue generated from a PES program may create the 




end (Goh & Yanosky, 2016). Even more extreme, Engle et al. (2008) point to instances 
where PES participants engaged in environmentally destructive management to qualify 
for higher payments later.  
Incentive-based conservation is also believed to usher in phenomena such as 
motivation crowding. This exists when a practitioner’s intrinsic motivations to act on 
behalf of a common good are “crowded-out” because it is believed sufficient 
compensation is not in place to justify the effort (Frey & Jegen, 2001). Incentives, 
therefore, model the notion that self-interest is the appropriate action in place of prosocial 
behavior (Cardenas et al., 2000). Bénabou and Tirole (2003) note incentives are also 
thought to compromise the role of self-determination, thus making intrinsic motivators no 
longer necessary. Further, they suggest, a perception may arise that if incentives are 
needed to perform a task, the activity itself is inherently negative. 
There are also structural critiques of PES programs that deserve consideration. 
Several of these apply because of the large geographical areas grasslands cover. A fallacy 
of composition becomes an adding-up problem, suggesting what works in one area may 
not work at other temporal or spatial scales (Skaggs, 2008). Additionally, there are 
substantial complexities to quantify and verify things like soil carbon sequestration across 
the spectrum of program participants (Gosnell et al., 2011). “Free-riding” is also believed 
to occur, wherein some individuals will benefit from the goods produced despite not 
participating or fully paying the costs that led to its provision (Obeng et al., 2018). In a 
grassland PES program, the suite of commodities produced and the interactions between 




motivations to free-ride as the number of buyers of any single ecosystem service increase 
(Gosnell et al., 2011). 
With a conservation effort as large as a domestic grassland PES program, there 
will be a necessity to streamline and maximize efficiencies. However, institutional 
approaches often are bureaucratic and make participation cumbersome (Gutwein & 
Goldstein, 2013). For example, in instances of a localized drought, the inability to modify 
a contractual arrangement could have lasting repercussions to the producer’s financial 
objectives and the integrity of the managed resource. Because ranching is closely tied to 
the natural environment, programs that fail to address the need for increased flexibility 
may remain unpopular (Kennedy et al., 2016). Furthermore, ranchers are often opinion 
leaders in rural communities, and a negative experience could quickly enter local 
information exchanges and affect program adoption (Gosnell et al., 2011). 
Limitations of the Research 
A limitation to this research was undoubtedly the medium for which it was 
distributed. Based on conditions originating from directive health measures and COVID-
19, we chose to move the entirety of this survey online. Previous research with ranchers 
often carries low response rates (Kennedy, 2018; Sliwinski, 2018; Troy et al., 2005). 
However, our 3.5% response rate likely reflects that the survey was only available in one 
medium. While we believe certain inferences can be made based on USDA (2019) 
Census Data, it is problematic to project these findings to all of Nebraska’s ranching 
operations.  
There are also limited applications of this research when examining the 




variables that were tested. As we sought to explore baseline preferences for 
programmatic structure, we intentionally used a methodology that allowed us to test a 
wide range of attributes. This provided us an opportunity to explore lower-order 
interactions, which we believe will be useful for researchers continuing to explore the 
feasibility of PES programs in Nebraska’s grasslands. However, we would urge caution 
in drawing definitive conclusions about any one specific attribute variable.  
Opportunities for Future Research  
We believe there are an array of contributions that others can make to further the 
research of PES programs in Nebraska. First, we find it logical to continue research in 
this field with practitioners who operate working ranches and are currently engaged in 
conservation stewardship. Building on studies surrounding ranchers’ perceptions of 
biodiversity and innovation (Sliwinski et al., 2018; Kennedy et al., 2016), an effort to 
create the sociological framework that moves a PES concept to a human-designed 
conservation program is a critical need.  
Another area of need surrounds the creation of the collaborative trust networks 
that are inherent to successful PES programs. We believe this can be accomplished 
through securing research funding, which is part of a leveraged approach to assist 
ranchers with developing pilot locations statewide. These sites, similar to other sites used 
for technology transfer, should be equipped to serve as the first information exchanges 
among potential program participants. These sites need to be accessible, replicable and 
bring together the cadre of entities that will be needed to make PES successful.  
The third and largest need will come from the understanding of how to establish 




cover areas of ecosystem service delivery, monitoring, and compliance, as well as how to 
market these services in a manner that resembles a commodities market exchange. 
Furthermore, because healthy grasslands exemplify diversity and complexity, it would 
only make sense for future research to embody an interdisciplinary approach that bridges 
natural-world capital with land manager motivations.  
Conclusion 
As livestock producers attempt to navigate shifting consumer preferences, rising 
input costs, and turbulent trade relationships, ranchers may be ready for alternative 
options that can diversify revenue streams and support their quality of life. If that can 
come from the marketing of non-traditional commodities such as ecosystem services 
remains to be seen. However, our research shows there is an appetite among ranchers to 
manage for goals such as biodiversity conservation. Given biodiversity’s importance to 
the health and productivity of grasslands, this has promising implications for future 
conservation partnerships with ranchers.  
Entities interested in grassland conservation may note this research did not find 
evidence of a statistical relationship between management actions and the 
compensatory/contract attributes. This suggests that current and future conservation 
efforts may benefit from allocating more resources to develop programs in consultation 
with ranchers (i.e., human-centered design), and rely less so on the financial incentives. 
Furthermore, conservation programs that assist producers with marketing their livestock 
products as compatible and supportive for wildlife, clean air, and water will find a larger 




through sound management and product marketing, creating the additional economic link 
to supplying an array of ecosystem services could be within reach.  
At the surface, PES programs appear to be a dramatic overhaul to current 
grassland conservation efforts. While PES seeks out innovation and alternative 
frameworks (e.g., practitioner-orientated, biodiversity conservation), it is important to 
recognize that there are already mechanisms in place that compensate ranchers for 
ecosystem services (e.g., protection of water resources). Furthermore, if federal funding 
and the resulting acres targeted for grassland conservation continue to decline, a new 
generation of conservation programs must emerge if the full suite of ecosystem services 
provided by healthy grasslands are to be maintained on the Great Plains. Given the 
sustained declines to grasslands, it may not be prudent to assume ranchers can or should 
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Researchers at the Institute of Agriculture and Natural Resources at the University of 
Nebraska-Lincoln are collecting information in order to understand Nebraska ranchers’ 
preferences for the design and implementation of grassland conservation programs. The 
results of this study will help us create a program that will provide economic links 
between ranching viability and maximum public and ecological benefit. 
 
This web survey is short and should only take about 10-15 minutes to 
complete. To access the survey online, please go to the link listed below 
go.unl.edu/grasslands 
 
The information you provide will be kept confidential and only be used for the research 
purposes of this project. All results will be reported so that no individual can be 
identified. Your participation is voluntary but greatly appreciated, and you may skip any 
questions you prefer not to answer. There are no known risks to participating in this 
survey, and you can refuse to participate at any time without harming your relationship 
with the University of Nebraska. There are no direct benefits to 
participation, though your feedback will help develop a grassland conservation program 
that benefits both the environment and Nebraska ranchers like you. 
 
If you have any questions about the survey, please do not hesitate to contact Kyle 
Martens who is conducting this survey at 402-472-2660 or kmartens3@unl.edu If you 
have questions about your rights as a participant, please contact the UNL Institutional 
Review Board at 402-472-6965 or irb@unl.edu. 
 
Survey link: go.unl.edu/grasslands 
 




Graduate Student and Researcher 





















Nebraska’s grasslands are an important ecological and economic resource for Nebraska. 
These areas provide ranching families with an income, a connection to the land and are 
often closely tied to family tradition. These lands also provide important habitat for 
prairie plants, animals, and migratory waterfowl. Despite the many benefits these intact 
grasslands provide, conversion to other land uses remains common throughout much of 
the remaining Great Plains grasslands. 
 
Numerous incentives for the conservation of “goods and services” exist for grasslands in 
the United States. Direct payments for the conservation of these resources are popular 
among some ranching families. However, in Nebraska, the need for technical and 
financial incentives to do conservation work is growing and is outpacing the ability to 
meet demand. 
 
An emerging conservation program that may potentially fill this void is called payment 
for ecosystem services, or PES. These PES programs assess landowner stewardship 
practices; identify nontraditional goods produced such as clean water, reduced soil 
erosion, or wildlife habitat; and then market and sell these goods. Potential buyers often 
include energy companies aiming to offset their production or development activities, 
state or local governments seeking to maintain water quality, and nonprofits interested in 
species conservation. 
 
Contracts for PES are voluntary and function like other programs, such as conservation 
stewardship program (CSP). One core difference is that PES programs can be leveraged 
alongside CSP, providing more operating income for ranchers. Additionally, neighbors 
can form cooperatives pooling their goods together to gain a higher price. 
 
This study seeks to understand what preferences Nebraska grassland managers have for 
conservation programs. You will be presented with a series two management options 
with an associated payment level and contract length are presented. Please select which 
option is the most attractive or select neither. 
 
The information you provide will be kept confidential and only be used for the research 
purposes of this project. All results will be reported so that no individual can be 
identified. Your participation is voluntary but greatly appreciated, and you may skip any 
questions you prefer not to answer. There are no known risks to participating in this 
survey, and you can refuse to participate at any time without harming your relationship 
with the University of Nebraska. There are no direct benefits to 
participation, though your feedback will help develop a grassland conservation program 
























 ------------------------------------------- block=1 --------------------------------------------- 
Obs block pair mgt1 mgt2 pay1 pay2 length1 length2 
 
1 1 1 0 15 1 5 0 1 
2 1 2 1 14 2 4 0 1 
3 1 3 2 13 0 3 1 2 
4 1 4 3 12 2 4 1 2 
5 1 5 4 11 0 3 2 0 
6 1 6 5 10 2 4 2 0 
7 1 7 6 9 0 1 0 1 
8 1 8 7 8 2 5 0 1 
 
-------------------------------------------- block=2 --------------------------------------------- 
Obs block pair mgt1 mgt2 pay1 pay2 length1 length2 
 
9 2 1 1 15 3 4 0 1 
10 2 2 2 14 0 1 1 2 
11 2 3 3 13 2 5 1 2 
12 2 4 4 12 3 4 1 2 
13 2 5 5 11 0 1 2 0 
14 2 6 6 10 2 5 2 0 
15 2 7 7 9 3 4 2 0 
16 2 8 0 8 0 2 0 1 
 
-------------------------------------------- block=3 --------------------------------------------- 
Obs block pair mgt1 mgt2 pay1 pay2 length1 length2 
 
17 3 1 2 15 3 5 0 1 
18 3 2 3 14 0 2 1 2 
19 3 3 4 13 3 5 1 2 
20 3 4 5 12 0 2 2 0 
21 3 5 6 11 3 5 2 0 
22 3 6 7 10 1 5 0 1 
23 3 7 0 9 1 2 0 1 
24 3 8 1 8 4 5 0 1 
 
-------------------------------------------- block=4 --------------------------------------------- 
Obs block pair mgt1 mgt2 pay1 pay2 length1 length2 
 
25 4 1 3 15 1 5 1 2 
26 4 2 4 14 1 2 1 2 
27 4 3 5 13 4 5 1 2 
28 4 4 6 12 0 3 2 0 
29 4 5 7 11 1 2 2 0 
30 4 6 8 10 4 5 2 0 
31 4 7 1 9 0 4 0 1 





-------------------------------------------- block=5 --------------------------------------------- 
Obs block pair mgt1 mgt2 pay1 pay2 length1 length2 
 
33 5 1 4 15 0 4 1 2 
34 5 2 5 14 1 3 1 2 
35 5 3 6 13 0 4 2 0 
36 5 4 7 12 1 3 2 0 
37 5 5 0 11 0 5 2 1 
38 5 6 1 10 1 4 0 1 
39 5 7 2 9 2 3 0 1 
40 5 8 3 8 0 5 1 2 
 
-------------------------------------------- block=6 --------------------------------------------- 
 
Obs block pair mgt1 mgt2 pay1 pay2 length1 length2 
 
41 6 1 5 15 1 4 1 2 
42 6 2 6 14 2 3 1 2 
43 6 3 7 13 0 5 2 0 
44 6 4 0 12 1 4 2 0 
45 6 5 1 11 2 3 2 0 
46 6 6 2 10 1 5 0 1 
47 6 7 3 9 2 4 0 1 
48 6 8 4 8 0 3 1 2 
 
-------------------------------------------- block=7 --------------------------------------------- 
Obs block pair mgt1 mgt2 pay1 pay2 length1 length2 
 
49 7 1 6 15 2 4 1 2 
50 7 2 7 14 0 3 2 0 
51 7 3 0 13 2 4 2 0 
52 7 4 1 12 0 1 0 1 
53 7 5 2 11 2 5 0 1 
54 7 6 3 10 3 4 0 1 
55 7 7 4 9 0 1 1 2 
56 7 8 5 8 2 5 1 2 
 
-------------------------------------------- block=8 --------------------------------------------- 
Obs block pair mgt1 mgt2 pay1 pay2 length1 length2 
 
57 8 1 7 15 3 4 1 2 
58 8 2 0 14 0 1 2 0 
59 8 3 1 13 2 5 2 0 
60 8 4 2 12 3 4 2 0 
61 8 5 3 11 0 2 0 1 
62 8 6 4 10 3 5 0 1 
63 8 7 5 9 0 2 1 2 
64 8 8 6 8 3 5 1 2 
 
